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Abstract
Since independence in 1975 Papua New Guinea (PNG) has adopted as its fundamental foreign policy
position the principle that the country is 'friends to all and enemies to none.' When PNG foreign policy
shifts from this principle the realist foundations of the Country's international relationships are
challenged. Under the administration of Bill Skate from 1997-1999 such a shift came close to being
realized as Papua New Guinean political players used foreign policy and diplomatic interests to justify or
extend their domestic political and electoral interests.
This paper focuses on diplomatic events in PNG at the end of Bill Skate's Government, examining in
particular his decision to switch diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei in 1999. This case study
shows that the immediate practical consequences of abandoning long-term foreign policy interests for
short-term domestic political considerations can have serious implications for a marginalised state such
as PNG. While a shift in policy was averted, PNG very nearly lost its reputation for neutrality and very
nearly brought diplomatic isolation onto itself, not to mention the wrath of China and Australia . Such ad
hoc foreign policy realignment undermines PNG's established foreign policy encapsulated in the principle
of 'friends to all and enemies to none,' which very nearly became 'friend to one, enemy to many.'
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‘Friend to one, enemy to many?’: The time of foreign policy struggle in
Papua New Guinea under the Bill Skate government (1997-1999)

Abstract
Since independence in 1975 Papua New Guinea (PNG) has adopted as its
fundamental foreign policy position the principle that the country is ‘friends to
all and enemies to none.’ When PNG foreign policy shifts from this principle
the realist foundations of the Country’s international relationships are
challenged. Under the administration of Bill Skate from 1997-1999 such a shift
came close to being realized as Papua New Guinean political players used
foreign policy and diplomatic interests to justify or extend their domestic
political and electoral interests.

This paper focuses on diplomatic events in PNG at the end of Bill Skate’s
Government, examining in particular his decision to switch diplomatic
recognition from Beijing to Taipei in 1999. This case study shows that the
immediate practical consequences of abandoning long-term foreign policy
interests for short-term domestic political considerations can have serious
implications for a marginalised state such as PNG. While a shift in policy was
averted, PNG very nearly lost its reputation for neutrality and very nearly
brought diplomatic isolation onto itself, not to mention the wrath of China and
Australia. Such ad hoc foreign policy realignment undermines PNG’s
established foreign policy encapsulated in the principle of ‘friends to all and
enemies to none,’ which very nearly became ‘friend to one, enemy to many.’
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Introduction
PNG foreign policy has been based ultimately on the interests and survival of
the state. It is because of PNG’s dependent nature, its experiences of pre- and
post-WW II colonisation by foreign powers, and the Realpolitik of international
relations under war-time Japanese occupation, that the people obeyed whoever
was more powerful. Such Realpolitik came about because survival demanded
co-operation.1 PNG has been subjected to a succession of overlords, first the
Germans, then the Australians and the Japanese.2 It was Australia, however,
that strengthened PNG’s dependent nature under a single centralised colonial
administration from 1949 until virtually 1975.3

Since 1974, before independence, PNG has pursued its national interest under
its loosely stated policy of ‘Universalism.’ Universalism later developed into
the ‘friends to all and enemies to none’ approach after PNG’s first independent
foreign policy principles were announced in 1975. Both became part of the first
comprehensive foreign policy adopted by PNG of ‘Active, Selective
Engagement (ASE)’ and this doctrine was outlined in its first Foreign Policy
White Paper in November 1981.4 The basic principles of which have informed

1 Stewart Firth, ‘The War in the Pacific’, in Donald Denoon [et al.], The Cambridge History of the
Pacific Islanders, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p310.
2 Richard Curtain, ‘Labour Migration from the Sepik’, Oral History vi: 9, 1978, p32, cited in Stewart
Firth, ‘The War in the Pacific’, in Donald Denoon [et al.], The Cambridge history of the Pacific
Islanders, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p311.
3
When the Australian Government became responsible for administering the Australian Territory of
Papua and the United Nations Trust Territory of New Guinea after the approval of the United Nations.
See, Sean Dorney, Papua New Guinea: people politics and history since 1975, Random House
Australia, Sydney, 1993; Stewart Firth, ‘The War in the Pacific’, in Donald Denoon [et al.] The
Cambridge history of the Pacific Islanders, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997; Oala OalaRarua, ‘Relations between Papua New Guinea and Australia’, in Edward P Wolfers (ed), Australia’s
Northern Neighbours: Independent or Dependent?, Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1976; and Ian Downs,
The Australian Trusteeship: Papua New Guinea 1945-1975, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1980.
4
The fundamental parts of ASE are: (1) the basic approach involves – identifying issues, opportunities
and problems which seems likely to be relevant to Papua New Guinea’s national interests. (2) selecting
those issues and actors (including governments, international organizations, multinational corporations,
etc.) which affect PNG and which PNG, some-times only with the support of others, can affect (3)
analysing the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative courses of actions or inactions; (4)
engaging actively with the issues and actors selected to secure our national interests. See, Peter King,
‘the Foreign Policy White Paper of 1981: a critique’, in King., Peter, Lee., Wendy, and Warakai.,
Vincent, From Rhetoric to reality?: Papua New Guinea’s Eight point plans and national goals after a
decade, University of Papua New Guinea Press, 1985, p274.
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the near consensus approach of PNG foreign policy and diplomacy since.5 It is
a policy that identifies short and long-term national interests. It also
encouraged PNG to develop various associated policies such as ‘independent
commitment to international cooperation’ (1985- 1988), ‘Look North’ (19921994) and ‘Look North and Work the Pacific’ (1994-1997).6

Despite PNG foreign policy being one of the country’s most stable policies, it
is not always immune from major political interference by political players. An
example of a highly politically charged policy is the Bougainville conflict.
Since 1989, successive governments tried to settle the conflict first by military
means and then, after persistent failure, by mobilising all available political and
diplomatic resources. The switch occurred partly because the consequences of
the conflict ultimately threatened to undermine the integrity of the PNG State
by creating serious implications for its economic development. This issue came
to a head in 1997 with the ‘Sandline Affair’, which not only involved complex
domestic political agendas and corrupt deals but also threatened a major
security destabilisation of the region. Yet Bill Skate’s government, which made
such a millstone for itself in settling the Bougainville conflict under the
Burnham Truce Agreement in October 19977, sacrificed a major PNG foreign
5

These intentions and objectives were defined in the ASE and have been adapted and pursued by later
successive governments.
6
See, Michael Somare, The Emerging Role of Papua New Guinea in World Affairs, Australian Institute
of International Affairs, Melbourne, 14 June 1974; also see, Azeem Amarshi and Kenneth Good and
Rex Mortimer, Development and Dependency: the political economy of Papua New Guinea, Oxford
University Press, Melbourne, 1979; Albert Maori Kiki, Assessment Report on Foreign Policy by the
Minister for Defence Foreign Relations and Trade to the House of Assembly, 6 December 1974, in
Universalism: Guidelines to the Foreign Policy of Paua New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1976; Peter King,
‘the Foreign Policy White Paper of 1981: a critique’, in Peter King, Wendy Lee and Vincent Warakai,
From Rhetoric to reality?: Papua New Guinea’s Eight point plans and national goals after a decade,
University of Papua New Guinea Press, 1985; Robert Igara, ‘Papua New Guinea’s regional
environment: Papua New Guinean perspectives’, in Edward P. Wolfers (ed), Beyond the Border:
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, South-East Asia and the South Pacific, the University of Papua
New Guinea Press, NCD, 1988; Papua New Guinea High Commission, PNG Mission Statement 1994,
Canberra, 1994; Papua New Guinea Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Reinforcing Papua New
Guinea’s Core Relationship: Summary of the Foreign Policy statement delivered by the Minister, Hon.
Kilroy Genia to the National Parliament on 31 July, 1996, Papua New Guinea Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, 12 August, Waigani, 1996; and Clive Moore with Mary Kooyman (eds), A Papua
New Guinea Political Chronicle: 1967 – 1991, Crawford House Publishing, Bathurst, 1998.
7 Government of Papua New Guinea, Neutral regional truce monitoring group for Bougainville: a
collection of key agreements and statements, Government of Papua New Guinea, Waigani, January
1998.
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policy commitment in order to gain a short-term financial benefit. It appears
that the policy change was initiated for the survival of the government, while it
imperilled the long-term integrity of the state.

PNG affairs are unusual in that when political players mobilise foreign policy
and diplomatic interests for their own domestic political benefits, they may
more often than usual succeed politically in the short-term at home. But such
domestic advantage does not automatically translate into diplomatic success in
either the short or the long-term. Critically, the price for diplomatic failure
from these kinds of actions by political players is far greater than the
immediate returns from success. In other words, a move, which is politically
successful at home, that advances short-term interests and limited domestic
political returns can easily sacrifice critical long-term foreign policy strategy.
The effect can partially or entirely undermine overall foreign policy goals of
stable inter/ intra-regional relations. And it has serious widespread diplomatic
consequences. Being highly dependent PNG has little freedom of movement on
the international stage. When there is any kind of short-term political shift
against the principal PNG foreign policy of ‘friends to all and enemies to
none,’ the situation quickly becomes a matter of survival, as this case study
demonstrates.

This paper will focus on diplomatic events in PNG in the concluding months of
Bill Skate’s Government by examining in particular his decision to switch
diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei in 1999. This case study shows
that the immediate practical consequences of foregoing long term foreign
policy interests for short term domestic political considerations can have
serious implications for a marginalised state such as PNG. While a shift in
policy was averted, PNG came close to losing its reputation for neutrality and
very nearly brought diplomatic isolation onto itself, not to mention the wrath of
China and Australia. Such ad hoc foreign policy realignment undermines the
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established foreign policy of ‘friends to all and enemies to none’ and PNG very
nearly became ‘friend to one, enemy to many.’

A time of foreign policy struggle: The Bill Skate government (1997-1999)
The Bill Skate government (1997-1999), attempted to gain short-term financial
benefit to offset the compounding effects of a cumulation of lax budgetary and
fiscal management. In so doing it partially, although not entirely, undermined
its long-standing foreign policy initiatives and PNG’s policy of neutrality
encapsulated in the slogan ‘friends to all and enemies to none.’ Skate’s
government coincided with increasing pressure from international financial
organisations and Australian Aid agencies to rectify its economic and financial
management. Prime Minister Bill Skate and his government displayed strong
opposition to almost every condition that was imposed on PNG by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) for releasing
financial assistance, which was coordinated with the assistance of other major
aid donors. Skate’s strong opposition against the conditionality of the IMF and
the WB was predictable. It was a position governed by the political tactic of
mobilising PNG’s newly established sense of nationalism and public sentiment
against the IMF and the WB.8 Hence, it was largely for the Skate government’s
domestic political consumption. But, it was diplomatically risky and costly. It
was almost from the start guaranteed to be futile.

Alongside an already problematic situation, the Skate government hired a
controversial former WB employee as the government’s chief economic
8 Even after Bill Skate resigned as the Prime Minister, there have been questions about the operations
of the World Bank and the IMF in PNG. Such sentiments and frustrations exploded in June 2001.
There was a demonstration against the World Bank’s structural adjustment plans and the rumoured
land mobilisation plan of the Morauta Government, which were combined with a demonstration against
a proposal for downsizing Papua New Guinea Defence Force. Downsizing would mean only half of
existing numbers (from 4200 to 1500) under the recommendation of a Commonwealth Eminent
Persons Group. This demonstration against the Morauta Government which succeeded the Skate
Government, ended up with 3 students dead and a demonstrator being shot by a Special Mobil Police
Squad from the Highlands Region. RJ. May (ed), ‘Arc of Instability’?: Melanesia in the early 2000s,
Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 2003, p3, and
also see, Anthony Siaguru, In-House in Papua New Guinea with Anthony Siaguru, Asia Pacific Press,
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adviser. Dr. Pirouz Hamidian-Rad who was the head of the World Bank field
office to PNG was hired against WB policy. Dr. Hamidian-Rad was known in
PNG as ‘million man.’ The name highlighted his controversial K7 million
contract with the Skate government, as its chief economic adviser. This
lucrative contract was coupled with the activities of his firm, known as IKUB
(I Kick Your Butt) Consulting.9 It was a combination of a series of related
economic factors that caused the deadlock between the Skate government, the
IMF and the WB. Officially, the deadlock was due to the contract between the
PNG government and a former WB employee that breached the Bank’s internal
regulation of a minimum two years’ separation from the former host country,
which in this case of course was PNG. However, it is not known to what extent
the Hamidian-Rad affair influenced the decision of the IMF and the WB to
withhold desperately needed financial assistance to PNG. Some observers
argued that:

Dr. Hamidian-Rad’s appointment created tension between the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund and the Papua New Guinea Government and
resulted in the refusal by these international agencies to forward previously
agreed loans to Papua New Guinea.

10

As a consequence of the deadlock, the Skate government went to the European
based international private bank ‘the Kredit Bank’11 seeking US$ 120 million
Canberra, 2001, pp262-265, 271-272, and 276-282. Also for issue of land mobilisation, see, L.T. Jones
and P.A. McGavin, Land Mobilisation in Papua New Guinea, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 2001.
9 See more detail, Charles Yala and Theodore Levantis, ‘Recent economic events in Papua New
Guinea: a counting drought in development’, Pacific Economic Bulletin: Volume 13 Number 2 1998,
National Centre for Development Studies, the Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 1998, PP 13-14. Also see
Hamidian-Rad’s account of conflict between PNG and the IMF and the WB, see, Sam Vulum, ‘Cover
Story: PNG’s debts still accumulating’, in Pacific Island Monthly: Vol. 68 No. 11 November 1998, Fiji
Times Limited, Sydney, 1998, p38-41, and also see, Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, ‘Focus: Wild Bill’ in
The Weekend Australian, July 10-11, 1999, p21.
10 Charles Yala and Theodore Levantis, ‘Recent economic events in Papua New Guinea: a continuing
drought in development’, Pacific Economic Bulletin: Volume 13 Number 2 1998, National Centre for
Development Studies, the Asia Pacific Press, Canberra, 1998, p13.
11 The identity of ‘Kredit Bank’ is not clear. However there have been reports that it was “a European
syndicate of banks led by the Kredit Bank of Netherlands” (Pacific Island Monthly March 1999, p22),
“the Kredit Banking Corp. of Europe” (Pacific Island Monthly May 1999, p28) and “the Kredit Bank of
Belgium” (Pacific Island Monthly September 1999, p36). See, Sam Vulum, ‘PNG still searching for
multi-million dollar lender’ in Pacific Island Monthly: March 1999, Fiji Times Limited, Sydney, 1999,
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in financial loans, which they failed to secure. It was later to result in a massive
blow out in PNG’s domestic borrowing and indirectly to its budget deficit from
1998 onward. Compounding the economic difficulties in 1997, PNG
experienced two natural disasters. The highland region was in crisis, being
affected by severe frost and one of most serious droughts in its history. PNG’s
economic performance had also been infected by the flow on effects from the
Asian Currency Crisis, which had hit hard some of PNG’s major aid donors
and trade partners, particularly Japan and South Korea.

The Skate

government’s budget blowout greatly exacerbated this tension.12

On 29 June 1999, PM Bill Skate and his Foreign Minister Roy Yaki made a
secret diplomatic deal with Taiwan that aimed to gain a financial assistance
package of US$ 2.5 billion13 from Taiwan in exchange for giving it full
diplomatic recognition. In effect it called for the abandonment of country’s
‘One China policy’, one of PNG’s major foreign policy commitments and a
central issue in the stability of the region. The policy was also critical to PNG’s
major aid donor - Australia, as China is one of its major trading partners. Since
1976, the ‘One China’ policy has framed PNG’s long-standing foreign policies
in the region. In its bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) it is a non-negotiable core. Moreover, PNG has supported the policy at
multilateral levels through the United Nations and Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) agreements. Therefore, a move to abandon the ‘One
China Policy’ would seriously damage PNG’s bilateral relations with not only
the PRC but with Australia. Moreover, it could bring strategic instabilities and

pp22-23, and The National, ‘Hamidian-Rad says PNG economy picking up’ in Pacific Island Monthly:
May 1999, Fiji Times Limited, Sydney, 1999, p28 and Sam Vulum, ‘PNG back in Australia’s fold’ in
Pacific Island Monthly: September 1999, Fiji Times Limited, Sydney, 1999, pp36-37.
12 For more financial implication, see the Australian Agency for International Development, The
Economy of Papua New Guinea – Macroeconomic Policies: Implications for Growth and Development
in the Informal Sector (International Development Issues No. 53), Economic Insights Pty Ltd, June
1999, Canberra, pp62-64.
13 Michael Manning, ‘Beyond 1999-some certainty for Papua New Guinea?’, in Pacific Economic
Bulletin Volume 14 Number 2 1999, National Centre for Development Studies, the Asia Pacific Press,
Canberra, 1999, P 12.
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uncertainty into the whole South Pacific region.14 Although, PNG could gain a
short-term financial advantage this deal came with massive diplomatic and
long-term economic costs to PNG.

Although Foreign Minister Yaki exchanged diplomatic notes on the deal and
later made a diplomatic communiqué announcing the “partnership” with his
Taiwanese counterpart on 5 July 1999, the US$ 2.5 billion that would lift PNG
out of its financial problems was promised, but never arrived.15 Furthermore,
on 7 July 1999, Skate made an unexpected move when he announced his
resignation. The newly christened ‘former Prime Minister’ Bill Skate argued in
his pre-resignation announcement regarding his decision on the Taiwanese
deal:

“I think the decision made on behalf of the people of Papua New Guinea
16

is to look north, friends to all and enemies to none.”

Indeed the announcement included an almost obligatory reference to the two
long standing pillars of PNG foreign policy: “friends to all and enemies to
none” and “Look North.” But the diplomatic outcomes and consequences from
the Taiwanese deal proved that Skate’s decisions on behalf of his immediate
domestic political benefits had undermined longstanding PNG foreign policy.
In other words, despite the reference, the whole deal was against these two
pillars of PNG foreign policy.

The event also showed the unique relations between PNG and Australia. When
the deal was reported publicly on 6 July 1999, the PRC immediately
14 For more information, see ‘Special Report: Diplomatic tug-of-war reveals Australia’s neocolonialist tendencies’ in Pacific Island Monthly: August 1999, Fiji Times Limited, Sydney, 1999,
pp10-11.
15 Later the deal was put off because “Normal procedures for opening diplomatic relations with other
countries, which had applied since independence, were not followed in the case of Taiwan.” See,
‘Special Report: Diplomatic tug-of-war reveals Australia’s neo-colonialist tendencies’ in Pacific Island
Monthly: August 1999, Fiji Times Limited, Sydney, 1999, p10.
16 ‘Special Report: ‘Wonderful two years’ – Skate’ in Pacific Island Monthly: August 1999, Fiji Times
Limited, Sydney, 1999, p9.
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condemned PNG’s deal with Taiwan and threatened to sever diplomatic
relations with PNG.17 Importantly, it lobbied Australia, which did not deny
using its influence to reverse the decision of the Skate government.18 A
spokesperson for the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
insisted PNG change its decision, by noting:

“We are firmly opposed to any country with diplomatic relations with
mainland China [i.e., PRC] having any official exchanges with
Taiwanese authorities and developing any official relations with
19

Taiwan.”

The response from Skate in his newly acquired position as PNG’s interim
government was predictable. Appealing to populist and nationalist sensibilities
the PM accused Australia of dictating the foreign policy decisions of a
sovereign country:

“I am sad to say that Australia thinks that PNG is their state.
Australians think that they can continue dictating to us. …Papua, New
Guinea is … a sovereign state, they must respect us. Australians are
equally trading with Taiwan and why shouldn’t we go further and
strengthen our relationship in that friendship.”20

Thus the deal did not only undermine PNG’s bilateral relations with PRC but
also with Australia, which has strongly committed itself to the ‘One China
Policy’, since 1972. It further affected regional stability in the South Pacific by
creating unnecessary diplomatic competition and tensions between PRC and
Taiwan so that South Pacific Island countries became a diplomatic war zone

17 Australian Agency Press, ‘A controversial time’, The Australian, Thursday July 8 1999, p7.
18 Paul Kelly, ‘Canberra’s spies put skids under PM’, The Australian, Thursday July 8 1999, p1.
19 Robert Garran and Richard McGregor, ‘Reaction: Canberra promises continued ties’, The
Australian, Thursday July 8 1999, p7.
20 ‘Special Report: ‘Wonderful two years’ – Skate’ in Pacific Island Monthly: August 1999, Fiji Times
Limited, Sydney, 1999, p9.
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over the issue of Taiwan gaining diplomatic recognition.21 A sign of conflict
between Australia and the PRC versus PNG and Taiwan was the stage of high
diplomatic tension between Australia and Taiwan. After continuous Australian
direct vocal opposition against the Taiwanese deal, Taiwan responded as
follows:

This has never happened before that any country, other than communist
China, voiced its opposition when countries switched their diplomatic
recognition from Beijing to Taipei. …It [Canberra] should keep [its]
hands out of the ties between PNG and us. We’ll convey our complaints
through proper channels.22

The day after this Taiwanese protest against Canberra, Taiwan was reportedly
drafting trade sanction measures against Australia, including allegedly
changing its iron ore imports from Australia to PNG. How PNG could have
fulfilled Taiwan’s iron ore needs is another question.23 Moreover, it seemed
that Taiwan and PRC understood well the unique relations between PNG and
Australia. As The Taipei Times said:

Australia is especially sensitive in this case because its patron-client
relationship with PNG is so notorious that China will take all actions by
PNG as actions by Canberra.

24

In the short time before the Prime Ministership of PNG was settled, Sir Mekere
Morauta, who was by then the most likely opposing candidate for the next
Prime Minister made clear his view in cautious remarks regarding the deal. In
an interview with Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) radio he said:

21 ‘Special Report: Fiji, Vanuatu could be next diplomatic battleground’ in Pacific Island Monthly:
August 1999, Fiji Times Limited, Sydney, 1999, p11.
22 Agence France-Presse, ‘Mind your own business, Taiwan warns Canberra’, The Australian, July 7
1999, p8.
23 It should be noted that PNG does not export iron ore according to a report appearing in the article.
See, ‘Diplomatic tug-war over PNG’s Recognition of Taiwan’, The National, July 9 1999.
24 Australian was directly involved with the PRC for its possible natural gas deal at that time. Agence
France-Presse, ‘Mind your own business, Taiwan warns Canberra’, The Australian, July 7 1999, p8.

10

“As a new government I have flexibility to review everything, including
that. …It’s something I’d have to be very careful about because it’s not
just between Papua New Guinea and Taiwan, there are regional and
international implications and I’d have to be mindful and sensitive to
that.”

25

In other words, in a worst-case scenario, PNG could bring itself into isolation
and could have become ‘enemy to many and friend to one’.

It is not being overly contentious to suggest that the Skate government’s
domestic oriented and political self-benefiting diplomacy nearly eventuated in
foreign policy disaster for the nation as a whole. Instead of making PNG more
independent it certainly brought about an important erosion of sovereignty by
strengthening the resolve of the Country’s major aid donors to tighten the
conditions of their assistance. There was a very significant shift towards more
use of tied aid.26 And even though aid flows have very often been affected by
domestic political and economic instability, for quite some time, the reactions
to Skate’s foreign policy adventures were dramatic.27

Skate brought renewed attention to PNG’s economic position at a time of far
reaching maladministration of its finances. His administration was beset by
crisis. For example in public health spending, much of the budget was
increasingly used to cover administrative costs. While there were increases in
some health worker’s salaries, such increases made very little impact on the

25 Agence France-Presse, ‘THE DEAL: Taiwan embrace faces a rethink’, The Australian, July 8 1999,
p7.
26 The aim was to marginalise political influences to the administrative process in foreign aid by
moving to more program and conditioned aid.
27
For example, the PNG national budget had two main forms of expenditure: recurrent and
development. The development budget included a Public Investment Program (PIP), a Rural
Development Fund (RDF) and District Support Grants (DSGs). About 65 per cent of the PIP budget in
1999 was funded by bilateral and multilateral donors; of that about 60 per cent of funds go to counterbudget or specific aid projects (C. Hunt and A. Mawuli and M. Gumoi and C. Yala and O. Sanida,
‘Public investment policy in Papua New Guinea’ in Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume14 Number2,
National Centre for Development Studies, Canberra, 1999, pp25-27).
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overall situation. Most salaries for health workers had been left outstanding for
a considerable period. The maintenance costs for facilities and spending
associated with cooperative aid projects with international aid donors, known
as counter-budget items, were not being met. Health expenditure in the
development budget between 1997 to 1999 grew such that in 1997 it was
approximately 1.5 per cent of total gross expenditure on investment in priority
sectors.28 In 1998, it was just above 2 percent and in 1999 was just below 3 per
cent.29 But health expenditure in the development budget did not necessary go
to assisting services or operating and maintenance costs, which could improve
the effectiveness of public health programs. The conflict with the World Bank
and the IMF had worsened public health spending on critical programs due to
the prolonged shortage of budget funds. In combination with this situation the
already implemented decentralisation program across the whole public health
sector resulted in a considerable number of aid posts closing due to a lack of
funds.30

The foreign policy and diplomatic implications of the Taiwanese deal show the
implications and consequences for PNG’s foreign policy and diplomacy of
exchanging short-term interest for long-term foreign policy goals. The
28

C. Hunt and A. Mawuli and M. Gumoi and C. Yala and O. Sanida, ‘Public investment policy in
Papua New Guinea’ in Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume14 Number2, National Centre for
Development Studies, Canberra, 1999, Figure2, p26.
29
C. Hunt and A. Mawuli and M. Gumoi and C. Yala and O. Sanida, ‘Public investment policy in
Papua New Guinea’ in Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume14 Number2, National Centre for
Development Studies, Canberra, 1999, Figure2, p26.
30
This situation was continuing even under the 2000 budget, of which, one of the main priorities was
increasing health spending. According to the World Bank, public expenditure on health in PNG
between 1990 to 1997 was 2.8 per cent of GDP. The percentage of central government total
expenditure on health between 1981 to 1990 was 9.3 per cent decreasing between 1991 to 1995 to 8.3
percent (World Development report 1997, TableA.3, p200). Additionally, per capita public expenditure
on health in PNG at US$ 26 per annum in 1994, is relatively low when compared with Fiji, which
spent US$ 45 per annum on per capita public expenditure on health. (C. Chand, ‘Health in Papua New
Guinea: a stocktake’ in Pacific Economic Bulletin: Volume12, Number2, 1997, Canberra National
Centre for Development Studies, Table5, p102). But one per cent was taken from health expenditure,
while at the same time, the population in PNG has dramatically increased. The total population was 2.4
million in 1970, 2,7 million in 1975, 3.1 million in 1980, by 1998, it increased to 4.6 million. (World
Development Report 1999/2000, Table3, p235, and the United Nations Development Programme,
Human Development Report 1997. Oxford University Press, New York, p177, and the United Nations
Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999, Oxford University Press, New York,
1999, p199). Moreover, UNDP estimated that the total population of PNG will reached 6.5 million by
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proposed deal undermined the legitimacy of the PNG State. In defence of
Skate, he was in an impossible position. He had to balance the populist basis of
his electoral and parliamentary support with the increasing determination of aid
donors to call for even greater controls. It is possible that the major foreign
policy shift of abandoning PNG’s “One China Policy” in order to secure a deal
with Taiwan was a direct consequence of two years of conflicts with the WB
and the IMF. The combined effect of such was that PNG was temporarily even
more marginalised and Taiwan was left as its only possible source of foreign
aid. But Skate’s brinkmanship was doomed from the start. Having only one
most likely insecure source of foreign aid was and is unrealistic, given PNG’s
financial situation at that time and in the present. How Skate imagined that he
would succeed with the deal is therefore a central issue.

There was every guarantee that the PRC and Australia would take aggressive
diplomatic steps to reverse the Taiwanese deal. What both the PRC and
Australian could do to PNG is a far more serious issue than what they would
probably have done. As the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
implied, in a none too subtle reminder, if PNG did not reverse its decision it
would have to reconsider how its national interests would be best served and
who its friends were:

“Papua New Guinea is an independent country, we can’t stop them
doing what they are doing…but that doesn’t preclude us from having an
opinion. …It is in Papua New Guinea’s interests…that at a very difficult
time they maintain their export market. … it [the Taiwanese deal] will
put off for the time being re-engagement with the IMF and the World
31

Bank. We would like to see that re-engagement take place.”

the 2015 (the United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1999, Oxford
University Press, New York, 1999, p199).
31 Mary-Louise O’Callaghan, ‘China target Downer on PNG’, The Australian, July 7 1999, p1.
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One thing was clear, PNG would be internationally isolated if it did not retain
its ‘One China Policy,’ and it was highly unlikely that PNG could survive
without international aid.

Such considerations lie at the heart of the realpolitik of the world in which
PNG exists. Hence, in less than a week after the resignation of Skate, the newly
elected Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta indicated a speedy review of the
Taiwanese deal and “restoring normal relations with PNG’s traditional sources
of development finance.”32 He also expressed an interest in meeting with the
Chinese President at the September 1999 APEC meeting.33

In a diplomatically and politically inspired move, Sir Mekere announced the
invalidation of the deal with Taiwan on the grounds of legality and the
technicalities of diplomatic protocol.34 Foreign policy implications and the
diplomatic outcome from reversing the Taiwanese deal by the new Morauta
government clearly show that Skate’s attempt at exchanging short-term
interests for long-term foreign policy goals was not in the best interests of the
state.

The PRC responded by being diplomatic to PNG sensibilities in its favourable
reaction to the new government’s decision that returned to the “One China
Policy.” It avoided blaming Skate or PNG by claiming that the whole saga
originated in a Taiwanese diplomatic plot against the PRC:

32 Radio Australia, ‘New PNG Government seems certain to review Taiwan recognition’, Pacific
Island Report, July 14, 1999, Pacific Island Development Program/East West Centre, the Centre for
Pacific Islands Studies/University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, at http://166.122.164.43/archive/1999/july/0715-03.html, accessed on May 26, 2003.
33 Radio Australia, ‘New PNG Government seems certain to review Taiwan recognition’, Pacific
Island Report, July 14, 1999, Pacific Island Development Program/East West Centre, the Centre for
Pacific Islands Studies/University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, at http://166.122.164.43/archive/1999/july/0715-03.html, accessed on May 26, 2003.
34 ‘Taiwan deal flawed and invalid: PNG Prime Minister Sir Mekere’, Post-Courier, July 22, 1999 in
Pacific Island Report, Pacific Island Development Program/East West Centre, the Centre for Pacific
Islands Studies/University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, at http://166.122.164.43/archive/1999/july/07-2201.html, accessed on May 26, 2003.
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“The Chinese government expresses a high degree of appreciation for
the wise decision, …[t]he Taiwanese authorities’ plots to spilt the
35

motherland are bound to fail completely…”

Meanwhile, the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, on a state visit
to the PRC on July 11 1999, was little more than disingenuous in his comments
on the decision by the Morauta government. He denied any suggestions that
Australia had ever acted in the PRC’s interest or on its behalf by pressuring the
Morauta government to write off the Taiwanese deal.

“We had some discussion about the issue but they simply asked for my
assessment of the situation in PNG, and that was two days before the
final resolution of who was to be the prime minister [.] …I told the
Chinese at the time it was very hard to predict how it would turn out.
…They didn’t ever lobby me or ask me to do anything for them and that
was a matter they’ve had to deal with PNG not through a third
country.”36

The Taiwanese government appeared on the surface to display neither
bitterness, nor any sense of being ambushed by the decision of Morauta
government to reverse the deal. Publicly, it adopted a conciliatory position in
its statement, saying rather cryptically that “[w]e will not of our volition sever
ties with Papua New Guinea [.]”37 But clearly it had suffered a dramatic
diplomatic reversal. Nonetheless, it would have had little to gain from being
indicative of its true feelings. Taiwanese calculations of the national interests
involved would have indicated that the ploy had but a small chance of success.
35 ‘Taiwan won’t cut ties with Papua New Guinea’, Pacific Island Report, July 23, 1999, Pacific
Island Development Program/East West Centre, the Centre for Pacific Islands Studies/University of
Hawai‘i at Manoa, at http://166.122.164.43/archive/1999/july/07-23-02.html, accessed on May 26,
2003.
36 ‘Taiwan won’t cut ties with Papua New Guinea’, Pacific Island Report, July 23, 1999, Pacific
Island Development Program/East West Centre, the Centre for Pacific Islands Studies/University of
Hawai‘i at Manoa, at http://166.122.164.43/archive/1999/july/07-23-02.html, accessed on May 26,
2003.
37 ‘Taiwan won’t cut ties with Papua New Guinea’, Pacific Island Report, July 23, 1999, Pacific
Island Development Program/East West Centre, the Centre for Pacific Islands Studies/University of
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The Skate government intended to secure its own political survival by
potentially sacrificing the survival, if not of the state of PNG at the very least
its international legitimacy, for the promise of financial aid. Immediately after
the appointment of Sir Mekere Morauta as Prime Minister, it became clear that
the ‘realities’ of PNG’s position were apparent to him. He announced his
government’s immediate objectives in what was known as Morauta’s plan of
action.38 These objectives were to:


Restore stability, integrity, confidence and trust in the public
service.



Stabilise the national currency (Kina) as soon as possible and
allow it to regain its lost respect in the international community



Stop the rapid increase in prices of even the basic goods and
services



Devise the right monetary and fiscal policy mechanisms that
will halt the currency falling further.



Reopen dialogue with the World Bank and the International
Monetary fund soon.



Approach fellow Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
leaders at the next summits in New Zealand in September
[1999] for support and cooperation.



Stabilise and the strengthen budget formulation, revenue
collection and expenditure processes.

Hawai‘i at Manoa, at http://166.122.164.43/archive/1999/july/07-23-02.html, accessed on May 26,
2003.
38 Franzalbert Joku, ‘Suddenly, new hope for economy: enter the technocrat and businessman’,
Pacific Island Business, August 1999, Island Business International, Suva, 1999, pp20-21.
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Step up business investment and business growth.



Resource development and increased investment in agriculture
projects.



Speedy resolution to the political conflicts in Bougainville.

The action Plan shows clearly what are the priorities for PNG foreign policy in
negotiating its international relations. Moreover, as PM Sir Mekere clearly
identified the fine balance of PNG foreign policy on the issue:

“The One China policy that Papua New Guinea has followed since
independence remained intact, …[i]n reaffirming the One China policy,
my government remains grateful to the people of Taiwan for their
friendship, and their continued support, …[a]nd within this framework,
the [PNG] Government will do its utmost to develop that relationship
with Taiwan to the fullest extent possible. I want to assure the people and
Government of Taiwan that we remain friends in the region, and we
recognize the help and the assistance that they have given to Papua New
39

Guinea.”

But mindful of the continuing economic ties with Taiwan he was careful to the
point of being obsequious in maintaining ties. In the interest of its own
existence, therefore, PNG’s foreign policy returned to ‘friends to all and
enemies to none.’

The tenuous nature of PNG’s foreign policy would remain however. Sir
Mekere Morauta would experience continuing difficulties in dealing with
constant international pressures and balancing them with domestic constraints.
Pressure was exerted, not only from the WB and the IMF and other aid donors
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such as Japan and the EU, but more particularly by increased pressure from
Australia. This scenario was more damming than helpful to improving his
political situation.40 The failure to maintain the fine balance between the degree
of dependency upon Australia and Australia’s interference to PNG’s domestic
affairs, did in fact partly cost Sir Mekere his Prime Ministership.41 In this
sense, it can be argued that the Morauta Government restored the foreign
policy principle of ‘friends to all and enemies to none.’ But it failed to restore
the fine balance between accepting demands from the international friends of
PNG and convincing the PNG public that its government was still sovereign.
He had to demonstrate that his policies such as privatisation and restructuring
programmes did not result from actions ‘a big brother’ demanded of PNG.42 In
the end, whatever the view of the Australian Government toward the Morauta
Government, Morauta also fell into the trap of sacrificing the foreign policy
principle of ‘friends to all enemies to none.’ The long-term foreign policy
commitment was exchanged for the short-term interest of the Morauta
Government’s survival. Despite Sir Mekere Morauta’s claims to be a champion
of economic management, events soon proved that he would also fail. The end
of the Morauta Government coincided with the National Budget deficit
reaching, for PNG, an unsustainable level of between K 550 million to K 650

39 From, ‘Taiwan Deal flawed and invalid: PNG Prime Minister Sir Mekere’ Post-Courier, July 22,
1999, and see ‘Political Briefing: Papua New Guinea’, Pacific Island Business, September 1999, Island
Business International, Suva, 1999, p30.
40
It was that public perception toward Sir Mekere was worsening. At less than a week ahead of the
polls in 2002 PNG General Election polling, on June 24 2002. ‘Four Corners’ an investigative TV
programme of Australian Broadcasting Cooperation (ABC) reported an allegation involving a former
senior World Bank official to PNG. He claimed that he was expelled by the Morauta Government
because he resisted pressure from both the Morauta Government and the Australian Government to
“lower the bar” on the bank’s requirement for releasing the US$ 200 million fund to PNG. (Australian
Broadcasting
Cooperation,
Four
Corners,
‘The
Insider’,
June
24,
2002,
at
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s590512.htm, accessed on May 5 2004).
41
The Australian government’s heavy interference and even manipulation of certain PNG’s domestic
and international policies contributed to public outrage and anger against the Morauta government. In
deed one daily newspaper reported that “Australia pressured international lender the World Bank to
play down Papua New Guinea's acute problems in a bid to keep Sir Mekere….” (Jim Baynes,
‘Australia pressured to support Sir Mekere's govt: Report’, The National, June 25, 2002, at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/0625/nation4.htm, accessed on June 25, 2002, and also see, ‘Sir Rabbie
warns
of
slipping
PNG-Aust
ties’
The
National,
July
26,
2002,
at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/0726/nation11.htm, accessed on July 26, 2002).
42
Opinion, ‘Australian aid matters more than ‘bias’’, The National, July 26, 2002, at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/0726/opinion1.htm , accessed on July 26, 2002.
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million.43 For all his economic ability he could not overcome the structural
problems of PNG’s political economy.44

Conclusion
Since independence in 1975 PNG has adopted a fundamental foreign policy
position based on the epithet that the country is ‘friends to all and enemies to
none.’ As this paper has shown it is a principle that is hard to sustain in
practice. Nonetheless, PNG has few options. It has to survive in a harsh
environment where it can ill afford to get offside with its powerful neighbours.
The geo-political ambitions of Australia, China and Taiwan give it little room
for manoeuvre. Such realism is a hard taskmaster for PNG. It often means
43
See ‘EFIC warns of economic crisis’, The National, July 1, 2002, at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/0701/nation12.htm, accessed on July 1 2002; and also see, Roger
Donnelly, COUNTRY RISK ASSESSMENT: Papua New Guinea, Export Finance and Insurance
Corporation, Sydney, December 21, 2001, at http://www.efic.com.au/economics/cra_png.asp, accessed
on January 11, 2002; and ‘Government official condemns EFFIC report’, The National, November 11,
2002, at http://www.thenational.com.pg/0115/nation6.htm, accessed on November 11, 2002; and
‘Economy
headed
for
more
strife’,
The
National,
October
31,
2002,
at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/1031/nation6.htm, accessed on October 31, 2002; and Mark Forbes,
‘Australian spied on PNG, says expelled official’, The Age, Tuesday, June 25, 2002; and Jim Baynes,
‘Australia pressured to support Sir Mekere's govt: Report’ in The National, June 25, 2002, at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/0625/nation4.htm, accessed on June 25 2002; ‘Media ban deplored’ in
Post-Courier Online, June 26, 2002, at http://www.postcourier.com.pg/, accessed on June 26, 2002.
44
It should be noted that Morauta had also severely compromised PNG’s sovereignty by his economic
policies and his involvement in Australia’s notorious Pacific solution. Morauta agreed to continuing
and increasing demands from Australian for greater control of PNG economic policy while increases
financial injection from Australia by allowed the Australian government to use Manus Island as an
immigration detention centre, a move that appears to contravene the PNG Constitution (see, ‘Treat
refugees
as
refugees,
not
prisoners’,
The
National,
October
23
2001,
at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/1023/opinion1.htm, accessed on October 23 2001; ‘Prime Minister tells
Pundari, Lalatute to resign: Letter on refugees angers Sir Mekere’, The National, October 26 2001, at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/1026/nation1.htm, accessed on October 26 2001; ‘Pundari accuses PM
of
'double
standards',’
The
National,
November
5
2001,
at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/1105/nation4.htm, accessed on November 5 2001; ‘Implementation of
MOU on asylum seekers satisfies Waiko’, The National, November 29 2001, at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/1129/nation8.htm, accessed on November 29 2001; ‘PM thanks
Howard
for
Australia's
support’,
The
National,
March
6
2002,
at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/0306/nation3.htm, accessed on March 6 2002; ‘Aust spent $114m on
Nauru/Manus
Island’,
The
National,
April
17
2002,
at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/0417/nation11.htm, accessed on April 17, 2002; ‘PM hammers ABC
over 'covert' report’, The National, April 18 2002, at http://www.thenational.com.pg/0418/nation4.htm,
accessed on April 18 2002; ‘Pacific Solution' to come under scrutiny’, The National, April 23, 2002 at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/0423/nation26.htm, accessed on April 23 2002; ‘Australia pressured to
support
Sir
Mekere's
govt:
Report’,
The
National,
June
25
2002,
at
http://www.thenational.com.pg/0625/nation4.htm , accessed on June 25 2002). In this sense, he had
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trying to achieve a fine balance, not only between the nations in the region, but
also between domestic and foreign policy. It is inevitable that PNG will
confront more crises of the kind discussed in this paper. Its populist pressures
are unlikely to abate and it faces an international situation where the doctrines
of pre-emption and neo-liberal governance will contribute to instability. Being
friends to all is not a naive principle for PNG; it is a fact of life. When PNG
foreign policy shifts from this principle the foundations of the country’s
international relationships are challenged. It is tempting to blame Skate’s
ineptitude for the Taiwan crisis, but to do so is to forget the growing sense of
nationalism in PNG and the difficulties that arise from the policies followed by
the IMF and World Bank and how to reconcile the two. Another challenge
comes from the internal dynamics of politics as practiced by political players in
Port Moresby and Waigani and how they mobilise foreign policy agendas in
pursuit of domestic political agendas.

Under the administration of Bill Skate from 1997-1999 the temptations of
brinkmanship and populism came close to being realized as Papua New
Guinean political players sought to use short term foreign policy and
diplomatic manoeuvres to justify or extend their domestic political and
electoral interests.

In this light, Skate’s action has been shown to be a rather desperate move with
little or no chance of long term success. Thus the question arises, despite
numerous occasions when domestic interests encourage, political interference
in PNG foreign policy and diplomacy for short-term considerations, how is its
foreign policy so stable? It may be partly because PNG has clearly identified
her national interests in the short and long term as part of comprehensive
foreign policy approach. This approach dates back to the Foreign Policy White
Paper of 1981 and its realist philosophical principle of ‘friends to all and

also discovered the difficulty of balancing domestic and foreign policy demands. He had also learnt the
lessons of marginalisation as it applies to a small dependent country.
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enemies to none.’ Invoking the meaning of the words requires a strong sense of
judgement not a literal mindset. But a small semi dependent nation like PNG
has little alternative. It is PNG’s recipe for survival in the world of realpolitik.
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